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COMMENTS
LIENS - ExTENT To WHICH CoMMON-LAw ARTISAN's LIEN llis
BEEN SuPPLANTED BY STATUTE -An artisan's lien is the right of a
bailee, who by his labor, skill, or material adds value to the chattel of
another at the request of the owner, directly or impliedly, to retain
possession of the chattel until the reasonable value of his services has
been paid.1 The right to this lien, which is a specific lien, is of commonlaw origin,2 and in the absence of anything inconsistent in the contract
has long been extended to all artisans. 3 This common-law artisan's lien,
however, has been supplanted by statute in some respect in all but
five states.4 In the other forty-three states and in the District of
BRoWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 460 (1936); 37 C. J. 307, notes 21, 22 (1925).
6 C. J. 1132, note 94 (1916).
3 6 C. J. 1132, note 96 (1916).
~ Delaware, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, and South Carolina. Louisiana has a statute
that gives a privilege, La. Civ. Code (1932), art. 3217, that is the same as the common-law lien, but there is no statutory provision for enforcement.
1

2
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Columbia, statutes have in various ways extended the artisan's lien
beyond one or more of its common-law limitations. In an attempt to
classify the numerous statutes into definite groupings, the best basis for
any division seems to be the extent to which they have extended the
common-law artisan's lien.
I.

The first and by far the largest group includes those states where
the scope of the artisan's lien is the same as at common law, except that
a more e:ffective means of enforcement has been provided by statute.
The only means of enforcing the lien at common law was the retention of the chattel until the debt was paid. 5 There was no right to sell
the subject matter of the lien,6 nor was there any remedy at law for its
active enforcement.7 And generally equity would not enforce the lien
unless it had jurisdiction on some other grounds. 8 The statutory means
provided for enforcing the lien vary, but in the majority of the states
of this group the lienor after a specified time and notice to the owner
is permitted to sell the property at a public or private sale. 0 Other
statutes allow the alternative remedies of enforcement by such a sale
or by a bill in equity. 10 Sometimes the sale is allowed only after a
hearing in court and an order by the judge 11 or after the property has
been appraised 12 or notice of the sale has been posted in three public
places.18 As a general rule, statutory enforcement of a lien is exclusive;
6 C.

J.

II37, notes 78, 79 (1916).
528 (1936).
7 37 C. J. 340, note 24 (1925).
8 37 C. J. 341, note 50 (1925).
9 Ariz. Rev. Code (1928), §§ 2043, 2044; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), § 5098;
Idaho Code (1932), § 44-705; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 43-601; Mich.
Comp. Laws (1929), §§ 13187, 13188; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926), c. 217, §§ 5-7;
N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937), § 2:60-33 [Comp. Stat. (1910), p. 3139, § 62]; Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, 1930), tit. 6, §§ 11-14; Tex. Comp. Stat. (.1928), §§ 5503, 5504;
Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1933), §§ 52-2-3, 52-2-4; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933), §§ 2692,
2693; W. Va. Code (1931), §§ 38-11-3, 38-11-14.
10 D. C. Code (1929), tit. 25, §§ 374-376; Iowa Code (1935), §§ 10343,
10344; N. Y. Consol. Laws (1909),, c. 38, §§ 200-206 [Birdseye, 1917, p. 4932;
McKinney, 1917, tit. 32]. Enforceable only in equity by petition for sale: R. I. Gen.
Laws (1923), § 4369.
11 Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 255, § 26; Miss. Code (1930), § 2255; N. C.
Code Ann. (1931), § 2474, action is in justice court or in superior court if over $200.
In two states court procedure is only necessary if the lien is above a certain amount.
Va. Code (1930), §§ 6443, 6449 ($20); Wis. Stat. (1937), §§ 289.41, 289.48
($100).
12 3 Colo. Ann. Stat. (Courtright's Mills, 1930), §§ 4570-4574, requiring also
that the lienor sell for at least two-thirds of the value set by appraisers; Wyo. Rev.
Stat. (1931), §§ 66-101, 66-105 to 66-108, with same requirement.
18 Tenn. Code (1932), § 7984.
5

6 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
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but equity will enforce it if the method provided is unavailable or not
regarded as exclusive. 14 Where the lienor is given the right to sell he
is bound to exercise good faith and reasonable diligence in an effort
to secure a fair price.15 It may seem that these statutory requirements
make such a sale impractical in many cases. However, it must be remembered that the legislatures, in so extending the artisan's lien,
were also concerned in protecting the interests of the owner and junior
lienors.
In eighteen of the states in this group the statute gives a lien to
any person who makes, alters or repairs any article of personal property
at the request of the owner or legal possessor for work, labor and
materials and in addition authorizes retention or sale on notice. Such
a statute, while providing for enforcement that did not exist at common law, is otherwise merely declaratory of the common law and can
only be asserted in the same cases as at common law and is interpreted
by common-law principles.16 The remaining states have statutes dealing merely with the method of enforcing the common-law lien.17
2.

In the second group are those statutes which, in addition to providing a method of enforcement of the lien, also abrogate the commonlaw requirement that the lienholder must retain possession of the
chattel in order to preserve his lien, and provide for an artisan's lien
even though the chattel has been voluntarily surrendered to its owner.
Possession was essential to the common-law lien, and if the artisan
voluntarily parted with the property the lien was lost,18 not to be
reinstated when he regained possession unless such was the intent
of the parties.19 The lien could not be extended beyond his possession,
even by contract, as against creditors or purchasers. 20 To be entitled
to such a lien under the majority of the statutes in this group, the
artisan must file notice of the lien within a specified time, usually
sixty days, after which he may foreclose in equity as in the case of a
chattel mortgage. 21 Such a notice must be filed with the court, recorder
14

37 C. J. 341, 342 (1925), and cases cited under notes 51-60.

u Winchester Rock & Brick Co. v. Murdough, 233 Mass. 50, 123 N. E. 344

(1919).
16
Quist v. Sandman, 154 Cal. 748, 99 P. 204 (1908). A lien was denied to
employees of contractor who was doing work on another's chattel.
17
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina and Rhode Island.
18
6 C. J. 1136, note 59 (1916).
19
6 C. J. 1137, note 75 (1916).
20
6 C. J. 1137, note 77 (1916).
21
Ga. Code (1933), §§ 67-2003, 67-2401; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), c, 82,
§§ 40-45; Kan. Gen. Stat. (1935), §§ 58-201, 58-202; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929),
§§ 52-201 to 52-203; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913), §§ 6877, 6878; Okla. Stat.
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of deeds, or county clerk, depending on the statute. That such an
extension of this lien is desirable seems obvious in view of the fact it
is usually not the custom in any business to demand payment before
allowing the owner to take and use his property. At the same time it
was necessary to avoid subjecting bona fide purchasers and creditors
of the owner to secret and hidden liens, a thing the law has never
favored. The result was a strict requirement of notice wherever the
statute gave the artisan such a lien. It is essential that the notice
describe the chattel so it may be easily identified, 22 for otherwise it
would not be much protection to purchasers and creditors. For the
same reason purchasers prior to filing of notice take free of the lien.
Other statutes permit enforcement of the lien after parting with possession by attachment at law or foreclosure in equity without any
statutory requirement of prior notice. 23 Under all these statutes extending the lien beyond the lienor's possession, a voluntary surrender
of the chattel to the owner is not a waiver of the lien; however, it is a
waiver of the right of possession of the chattel, which cannot be retaken
merely on the strength of the lien. 24.
At common law there was no lien if the owner had possession of the
chattel and the artisan repaired it on the owner's premises, even
though the value of the chattel was thereby enhanced. 25 Nor could a
mere employee of the owner claim a lien. 26 In neither case did the
person seeking the lien have the requisite exclusive possession of the
property. However, where the statute gives a lien though the chattel
be surrendered, it is not essential according to the Washington Supreme
Court 21 that the artisan shall ever have had possession of the article.
This view would apparently give a lien in both of the aforementioned
situations where it was denied at common law. In all other respects
(1931), §§ II00l-II0o4; Ore. Code Ann. (1930), §§ 51-501 to 51-506; S. D.
Comp. Laws (1929), §§ 1700A-1700E; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington 1922),
§§ n54-n57.
22
Coast Engine & Machine Works v. Barbee, 130 Ore. 159, 279 P. 264 (1929).
28
Ala. Code (1928), §§ 8863, 8864 (attachment in law court); Ark. Dig. Stat.
(1937), §§ 8820-8827 (court hearing and sheriff's sale); Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws
(1927), §§ 5369, 5382, 5384 (attachment); Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 105, §§
66-70 (attachment); N. M. Stat. Ann. (1929), §§ 82-401, 82-407, 82-411, 82-412,
(foreclosure in equity). In most of these states and those in note 20, supra, the statute
also gives a power of sale if possession is retained, yet Oklahoma expressly forbids a
private sale.
24
Mathieu v. Roberts, 31 N. M. 469, 247 P. 1066 (1926); Alexander v. Mobile
Auto Co., 200 Ala. 586, 76 So. 944 (1917).
25
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 460 (1936).
26
BR0WN,PERSONALPR0PERTY461 (1936); 6 C. J. n33, note 6 (1916).
27
Prescott Co. v. Franklin Tool Works, l 17 Wash. 283, 201 P. 308 (1921),
corporation is given a lien though it was at no time in possession of the chattel but
supplied materials for its manufacture.
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these statutory liens will probably be considered as supplementing
but not supplanting the common-law lien and the rights thereunder. 28

3.
At common law it is necessary that the labor and materials furnished by the artisan add to the value of the chattel. It is for this reason that agistors were given no lien for the feed and care of animals. 29
Bailees other than innkeepers, common carriers and warehousemen
were not recognized as having a lien for mere storage even though
economically the value of the goods has been enhanced.80 Today
nearly all states have statutes recognizing the right of an agistor's lien
on animals,81 and under the third grouping are those statutes giving
artisans generally a lien for storage 82 as distinguished from the storage
lien of warehousemen, now given by statute in forty-four states,88
or of innkeepers and common carriers. These statutes give a lien for
safekeeping, protection and storage, raising the question whether a
person, such as a watchman, might claim a lien for protecting property
without storing it. Three of the states in this group further provide
that the statutory artisan's lien for labor and materials may be enforced by sale.84 The remaining four states are included in the
second group, except that North Dakota and Oklahoma the lien for
storage is lost if possession of the chattel is surrendered.
28

Howell v. Dodd, 229 Ala. 393, 157 So. 211 (1934), and Ross v. Spaniel,
122 Ore. 424, 251 P. 900, 259 P. 430 (1927), holding that the statute preserves the
common-law lien without the necessity of the lienors retaining possession and is to be
interpreted according to common-law principles.
29
3 C. J. 31, note 54 (1915).
80
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 465-466 (1936). See also 6 C. J. 1132, notes
97, 98 (1916), and 8 C. J. S. 292, note 72 (1938), for cases holding no lien at
common law for storage or services that do not enhance the value of the property.
81
3 C. J. 32, note 61 (1915). Typical statutes are: Ohio Code (Throckmorton,
1930), § 8353; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 255, § 24; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927),
§§ 8507-8511, also giving a power of sale to enforce the lien; N. Y. Consol. Laws
(1909), c. 38, § 183 [McKinney, 1917, tit. 32]. Possession by the Iienor is always
an essential requisite to enforce this lien.
82
Cal. Civ. Code (1937), §§ 3051, 3052; Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), §§
8507-8509; Mont. Rev. Code (1937), §§ 8383-8385. In these three states the lien
is dependent on possession but enforceable by private sale. In North Dakota, it is
enforced like a chattel mortgage. N. D. Comp. Laws (1913), §§ 6877, 6878. Okla.
Stat. (1931), § 10985, makes the lien dependent on possession but does not provide
for its enforcement. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), c. 82, §§ 40-45; and Ore. Code Ann.
(1930), § 51-501 to 51-506, extend the lien beyond possession and make it enforceable by foreclosure in equity.
38
See table of states adopting Uniform Warehouseman's Act with storage lien
in 3 Uniform Laws Annotated vii (1922).
34
California, Minnesota, and Montana, supra note 30.
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4.
Heretofore only those statutes dealing with the general statutory
artisan's lien and their effect on the common-law lien have been considered. However, numerous states have separate statutes which supplant the common-law artisan's lien only as to jewelers, silversmiths,
and watchmakers. In many cases this was the first statutory invasion of
the common-law artisan's lien. There is apparently no explanation
for the legislatures' singling out jewelers unless it is due to the fact
that jewelers, more than any other group of artisans, early organized
into associations and thereby had a stronger influence. In Kentucky,
Maine and Maryland the statutory jewelers' lien is the extent to which
statutes have supplanted the common-law artisan's lien. In all, thirteen
states have statutes giving the jeweler a lien on personal property in
his possession for repairs, labor, and materials with power to enforce
it by sale, usually after one year. 85 Except for power of sale the lien is
declaratory of the common law. Though no case has been reported,
an interesting question of legislative intent and statutory construction
would arise if a jeweler should attempt to enforce his lien under
provisions of a general artisans statute with a shorter period before
sale instead of under the statute solely for a jeweler's lien.

5.
There remains unconsidered one lien closely related to the artisan's
lien, namely the garage-owner's lien, which is the subject of statutes in
many states. The lien may be given only for storage,8° or for labor and
materials,87 or for labor, materials and storage. 38 And in at least five
85 Ala. Code (1928), §§ 8868, 8869; Cal. Civ. Code (1937), § 3052a; Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1930), § 5097; Ga. Code (1933), §§ 67-2101 to 67-2105; Ky. Stat.
(Carroll, 1930), § 2504a-1; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 105, §§ 63, 64; Md. Laws
(1935), c. 269; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 255, § 31; Neb. Comp. Stat. (1929),
§§ 52-301 to 52-304; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926), c. 217, §§ 32, 33; N. Y. Consol.
Laws (1909), c. 38, § 186 [Birdseye, 1917, p. 4931; McKinney, 1917, tit. 32];
R. I. Gen. Laws (1923), § 4375; Wis. Stat. (1937), § 289.46.
86 Del. Rev. Code (1935), §§ 3344-3350; Iowa Code (1935), § 10345; Mass.
Gen. Laws (1932), c. 255, § 25; Tenn. Code (1932), § 7979; Va. Code (1930), §
6445; W. Va. Code (1931), § 38-u-4; Wis. Sm. (1935), § 289.43. A garage
owner would also have such a lien in those states giving artisans generally a lien
for storage, note 30, supra.
81 Md. Ann. Code (1924), art. 63, § 54, extends the common-law artisan's lien
by allowing it though possession is surrendered.
88 Ariz. Rev. Code (1928), § 2042; Cal. Civ. Code (1937), § 3051-7; Ind.
Stat. (Burns, 1933), § 43-801; Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1930), § 2739h-1, 2; Me. Rev.
Stat. (1930), c. 105, §§ 56, 57; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929), § 3218; Nev. Comp. Laws
(1929), § 3772; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926), c. 217, §§ 35, 36; N. J. Rev. Stat.
(1937), § 2:60-20 to 2:60-31 [Comp. Stat. Supp. (1925-1930), § 135-46]; N. Y.
Consol. Laws (1909), c. 38, § 184 [Birdseye, 1917, p. 4930; M,cKinney, 1917, tit.
32].
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states the statute permits the lien though the garage owner surrenders
possession. 89 Absent such provision in the statute, two courts have
held there is no lien if the owner has use of the auto while stored,40
but a contrary result might be reached where the court has held that
temporary possession, of the owner would not defeat a lien for keeping
and feeding animals. 41 In Missouri the garage owner's lien statute has
resulted in the only situation where the common-law artisan's lien has
been limited by statute. At common law a garage owner would be
entitled to an artisan's lien for labor and materials for repair of an auto
in his possession without any written contract or memorandum of
work done. But under the Missouri statute no such lien can be obtained
without a written memorandum of the work and materials furnished
or to be furnished signed by the owner,42 which is clearly a restraint
or qualification of the common-law lien.

6.
In general, statutory liens in derogation of the common law are
looked upon with jealousy and their provisions are strictly construed.43
It has been held, however, that a statutory artisan's lien, being for
the protection of the laborer who has expended labor and furnished
material for the benefit of the owner of the chattel, should be liberally
construed.44 However, the claimant of the lien must bring himself
clearly within the law, and compliance with every essential requisite is
necessary. 45 The same is true as to the statutory provisions dealing with
enforcement. Substantial compliance is necessary here also or the lien
fails. 46 Statutory liens cannot be extended by the courts to cases not
89 Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri. The same should
be held in Oregon and Illinois where artisans generally are given a lien for storage
that is not dependent on possession. Supra, note 30.
4
°Fishback v. Foster, 23 Ariz. 206, 202 P. 806 ( I 922), holding no lien for storage
if owner uses auto while stored. Also Smith v. O'Brien, 46 Misc. 325, 94 N. Y. S. 673
(1905), where a lien for repairs and supplies was refused if the owner used the auto
at his pleasure.
41
Welsh v. Barnes, 5 N. D. 277, 65 N. W. 675 (1895).
42
Butterworth v. Soltz, 199 Mo. App. 507, 204 S. W. 50 (1918).
48
37 C. J. 309, note 57 (1925).
44
Coast Engine & Machine Works v. Barbee, 130 Ore. 159, 279 P. 264 (1929).
45
Cook v. Bowden, 3-2 Ga. App. 498, 124 S. E. 60 (1924), holding claimant
of lien must demand payment of the owner when due as required by the statute or
lose his right to sell the subject of the lien. See also Duby v. Hicks, 105 Ore. 27, 209
P. 156 (1922); Covey Motor Car Co. v. Kliks, III Ore. 394,225 P. 1097 (1924);
West Allis Industrial Loan Co. v. Stark, 197 Wis. 363, 222 N. W. 310 (1928);
and 37 C. J. 309, note 61 (1925). All hold that substantial compliance with every
essential requisite of a statutory lien is necessary to be entitled to the lien.
46
Tulloch v. Cockrum, II5 Ore. 601, 236 P. 1045 (1925), proceeding to foreclose a lien in equity on chattels.
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expressly provided for by the statute.47 Where the statute names those
entitled to the lien, the plaintiff must show clearly that he comes within
one of the classes mentioned.48 However, though the statutory artisan's
liens are not expressly extended to corporations, it has been held that
such legal persons as well as individuals are entitled to the lien.49
Further, it must be remembered that there is no right to a lien unless
the work be done at the request of the proper party. At common law
and under statutes declaratory thereof the lien only arises when the
work is done at the request of the owner or by his authority or under
circumstances from which his assent can be reasonably implied. 50 It
would not, therefore, extend to one not in privity with the owner.
However, under a statute so providing, the lien may arise "at the
request of the owner, his authorized agent, or lawful possessor," and
the latter means one with apparent authority to contract for repairs
but not one who himself has contracted to do the work. 51 Under such
a statute the artisan can assert a lien against the owner where he repaired the chattel at the request of one having only legal possession. 52
Finally, even after one has satisfactorily complied with all the requisites to entitle him to a lien on a chattel he still may be stopped from
enforcing it. For instance, the lienor will not be allowed to sell the
property under statutory authorization while a dispute between himself and other creditors of the bailor as to the amount and nature of his
debt is pending. 53 The lien may also be discharged at this stage, permitting trover against the lienor, by the chattel owner's tendering
a bond for the amount due. 54 If, however, these circumstances do not
arise, the lienholder can continue in the enforcement of his lien. As a
general rule, the proceeds from the sale of the subject matter of the
lien are applied to discharge the lien and the costs and expenses of
the sale, while the balance, if any, goes to the owner. 55
From all that has been stated, it is clear that the common-law
Fishback v. Foster, 23 Ariz. 206, 202 P. 806 (1922).
A plumber is not a machinist, blacksmith, wheelwright, or boilermaker within
the statute giving an artisan's lien. Modern Plumbing & Heating Co. v. American
Soda Fountain Co., 57 Wash. 148, 106 P. 628 (1910).
49 Where statute gives lien to blacksmith, woodworker or other mechanics, that
includes corporations as well as individuals. Henderson v. Alabama Auto Co., 209
Ala. 482, 96 So. 627 (1923).
50 8 C. J. S. 291, note 60 (1938).
51 8 C. J. S. 291, note 61 (1938).
52 Davenport v. Grundy Motor Sales Co., 28 Cal. App. 409, 152 P. 932 (1915).
53 8 C. J. S. 298, note 80 (1938).
54 Gilman v. Zirkin, 265 Mass. 372, 164 N. E. 373 (1928). Statutes frequently provide that the owner may recover his property by giving a bond. Conn.
Gen. Stat. (1930), § 5098; Iowa Code (1935), § 10354; Md. Ann. Code (1924),
art. 63, § 55; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 255, §§ 33, 34.
55 8 C. J. S. 298, note 91 (1938).
47

48
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artisan's lien has been supplanted to such an extent by statute that it
is now the exception rather than the rule. However, the numerous
statutes do not in any case completely replace the common law but only
change certain aspects of it; so except where inconsistent a statutory
lien is always interpreted on the basis of the common-law artisan's
lien. With one exception, in Missouri, it has been the tendency of the
legislatures to extend and remove limitations on the scope of the
common-law lien. For the most part they have attempted to give the
lienor a more adequate means of enforcement, and in this process there
has also in many states been a relaxation of the possession requirement.
But from an examination of these various statutory provisions in the
foregoing paragraphs, it is clear that they offer no adequate remedy to
the lien claimant in a great many cases. Where the statute provides
for some court proceedings in either law or equity before the chattel
can be sold, it is obvious that this remedy is available only where the
chattel is of sufficient value to assure the lienor that he will be able
to recover his expenses as well as the lien charge. In a vast number
of cases the artisan would be forced to claim only a common-law lien,
for the statutory procedure would be too burdensome and expensive.
Even where the lienor can sell the property without going into court
he is confronted with the problem that if he fails to comply substantially with any statutory requirement the sale is void and a nullity
and the buyer will acquire no title. 56 If he fails to follow the statute
as to demand, notice, or time of sale the courts will set it aside. As a
consequence it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a buyer unless
the statute allows him to buy the chattel himself as it does in Michigan,57 for needless to say very few persons can be found to buy a
chattel which may be taken from them because their vendor did not
comply with some statutory requisite. It is not difficult to see that in
many instances the artisan's position has been little improved from
that which existed under the common law. To say the least, the claimant
of an artisan's lien has a hazardous task, and the only way he may
be assured of success is to follow the exact letter of the statute in his
state. In the case where the artisan and owner are in different states,
the right to a lien depends on the law of the state where the contract
is to be performed. 58
On the whole, however, the scope of the common-law artisan's
lien has been broadened by the statutes, so as to give the artisan a
more effective remedy. The enforcement provisions have made it
56 Peerless Ins. & Brokerage Co. v. Dwyer Equipment Co., 78 Cal. App. 141,
248 P. 303 (1926).
57 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 13188.
58 Berlet v. Lehigh Valley Silk Mills, (C. C. A. 3d, 1923) 287 F. 769.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 37

possible for the lienor to get the money he wants instead of being
burdened with the care of another's chattel, and have made a lien
practical where under the common law the lien could not be claimed
due to the expense of keeping the property. Under statutes which relax
the possession requirement, the owner is benefited and the artisan who
trusts the owner and returns the property before he is paid is no longer
penalized. While it is desirable that a laborer be compensated for his
labor and materials, it is also essential to protect the interests of the
owner and of bona fide purchasers and creditors of the owner. The
ample protection of these latter interests justifies what may appear to
the lien claimant as burdensome requirements imposed by the legislature and the strict construction and application of these statutes by the
courts. The owner should be given a reasonable opportunity to prevent
the loss of his property, especially where he is only temporarily unable
to pay. The necessity of providing ample notice to purchasers and
creditors of any lien to be enforced against them needs no further
discussion. In conclusion, it might be suggested that those statutes
allowing an artisan's lien, enforceable by foreclosure, after surrendering
possession of the chattel upon filing proper notice have extended this
remedy as far as it is practical to do so without injuring the rights of
other parties concerned.
A h p B
rt ur . oynton

